ABSTRACT With the rapid growing demand for transmission rate, transmission security is becoming increasingly important. This paper proposes a novel scheme aiming at transmission security enhancement on the basis of the spatial modulation technology. In the proposed scheme, the transmitter maps the information bits to the index of a receive antenna, then a precoding vector is randomly selected in the null space of the targeted antenna. Due to the randomness of the precoding vector, it's difficult for the eavesdropper in unknown locations to detect the index of the targeted antenna using maximum-likelihood detection, hence its receiving performance can be greatly degraded compared with the legitimate receiver. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results verified the secure enhancement performance of the proposed scheme. Moreover, unlike most of the existing schemes which require that the transmitter should equip more antenna than the receiver, our scheme works well even if the transmitter has less antennas than the receiver.
I. INTRODUCTION
Spatial modulation (SM) is regraded as one of the most promising techniques in multiple-input multipleoutput (MIMO) systems, which utilizes the index of the activated antenna associated with conventional PSK/QAM modulation to convey information [1] , [2] . Spatial modulation can be applied to overcome the invincible defects, such as inter-antenna synchronization and inter-channel interference. Jeganathan et al., in [3] built the basic model of spatial modulation, i.e., the space-shift keying (SSK), which modulates the messages via a single transmit antenna on the basis of the predetermined one-to-one mapping between the block of data bits and the spatial position of the selected antenna. Later, the concept of SSK was further extended to generalized space shift keying (GSSK) in [4] , where more than one transmit antenna is activated. Indeed, spatial modulation can greatly improve the spectral efficiency of the multi-antenna systems [2] , [5] - [8] .
Recently, researchers devoted to spatial modulation have shown an increasing interest in receive spatial modulation (RSM) [9] , [10] , also known as precoding-aided spatial modulation (PSM) [11] - [13] , which can convey partial information by appropriately selecting the receive antenna index in a
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receive spatial modulation manner. Specifically, the transmitter activates all the transmit antennas and uses precoding to target the transmitted information flow at one or more specific receive antennas.
With the rapid increasing of transmission rate, the significance of secrecy and reliable transmission has become incredibly significant. In this respect, physical layer security has gained pivotal attention in recent years for its remarkable performance in information security enhancement. Many security enhancement schemes and algorithms were proposed for SM systems [14] . For example, [15] proposed a secure unitary coded SM scheme (UC-SM) for multi-input single-output (MISO) system. To improve the secure performance of SM system, two transmit antenna selection schemes (TAS) were proposed in [16] . In [17] , the authors investigated the effect of transmitter side channel state information (CSI) on achievable secrecy rate and proposed an iterative algorithm for optimal precoding. To against passive eavesdroppers in unknown locations, [18] studied the efficacy of active security measure through joint signal and jamming transmission without the typical requirement of eavesdropper channel information. For the secret PSM (SPSM) with passive eavesdropper, [19] proposed a precoder consists of two components: a basic zero-forcing precoder and a time-varying artificial noise (AN) aligned at the null space of legitimate receiver. For the SPSM with active VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ eavesdropper, [20] developed an optimized secure transmission scheme, which can minimize the information leakage. The performance of SPSM with finite-alphabet signaling was analyzed in [21] . The works in [22] generalized the PSM to multiuser (MU) downlink scenario where the downlink signals are precoded to cancel the MU interference and modulate partial information bits on the indices of receive antennas.
Since the security level of the MU-PSM is determined by the knowledge of precoder to the eavesdropper, scrambling on percoder is conceived to construct a fast-varying precoding matrix. In [23] , two novel schemes, namely RAS-PSM and HS-PSM, were proposed to enhance the security performance of PSM. The RAS-PSM uses a randomly selected subset of transmit antennas to perform PSM; the HS-PSM is an improved version of RAS-PSM by injecting extra artificial noise into RAS-PSM. The secure enhancement is easier if the CSI of main channel is known to the transmitter but unknown to the eavesdropper, for example, with a CSI dependent mapping of antenna indices [24] , [25] . If fact, the mutual information between the antenna index and the eavesdropper's observation can be made to zero with a properly designed CSI dependent precoder. For this reason, most of the researches works on the more challenging assumption that the CSI of legitimate link can be overheard or partially overheard by the eavesdropper. This implies that the transmit codebook (space of precoder) is known to the eavesdropper and the eavesdropper can decode the secret message carried by PSM with a maximum likelihood (ML) detector since the codebook is finite with the schemes presented in the aforementioned literature. Even with the random precoding scheme RAS-PSM [23] , the space of precoder is still finite since the combination number of transmit antenna selection is finite.
In this paper, we design a novel secure PSM scheme where the precoder is randomly selected in the null space of the targeted receive antenna. Since the null space of each receive antenna contains infinite number of vectors, this method can prevent the passive eavesdropper in unknown locations from using the standard ML detector which will exhaustly search all possible candidates.
The main features that distinguish our proposed scheme from the existing schemes are as following: F1:
F1: In our scheme, the information is conveyed by the index of a receive antenna and we use a precoder to nulling (minimize) the signal to be observed at the target receive antenna, while the existing PSM schemes generally activate (maximize) the signal at the target receive antenna; F2: In our scheme, the space of precoder is infinite while in the conventional PSM schemes, the information is carried with a finite size codebook. For example, the size of precoder space of RAS-PSM [23] is the product of the number of TAS patterns and the number of receive antenna activating patterns. For the SPSM proposed in [21] , the precoding vector can be divided into two components: the information bearing zero-forcing precoder and the perturbation part. The information bearing precoder has the same finite codebook as the normal PSM; Among these two features, F1 enables the receiver to use the low complexity energy detector (ED) and more importantly, this feature allows the transmitter to equip less antenna than the receiver. Theoretically, two transmit antenna is enough to nulling any one receive antenna out of arbitrary number of antennas; F2 prevents the eavesdropper from using standard exhaust searching ML detector and is crucial to the secure performance enhancement in our proposed scheme which will be elaborated later.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows: Section II describes the system model. The design of our proposed scheme is presented in Section III. Section IV analyze the symbol error rate (SER). The simulation results are shown in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: Scalars, vectors and matrices are denoted by non-bold, bold lower case, and bold upper letters, respectively. C stands for the complex numbers. The Hermitian, and inverse of matrix H is indicated with H † and H −1 . I N is the N ×N identity matrix. a represents the 2-norm of vector a. A F represents the Frobenius norm of matrix A. In addition, CN (0, σ 2 I N ) stands for circularly symmetric complex zero-mean Gaussian distribution with variance matrix as σ 2 I N . Besides, E[·] denotes the expectation operator. Finally, Pr(·) represents the probability of an event, and p Y (y) is the probability density function (PDF) of a random variable Y .
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. MIMO WIRETAP CHANNEL
Consider an MIMO wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1 , where the legitimate transmitter (Alice), the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) are, respectively, equipped with N a , N b and N e antennas. Assume that N a > 1, N b = 2 k where k ≥ 1 is an integer. The MIMO channel from Alice to Bob (the main channel) and from Alice to Eve (the eavesdropper channel) are respectively denoted by an Similar to most of previous works like [15] - [19] and etc., we assume that the channel state information (CSI) about H is known to Alice, possibly via the CSI report from Bob. However, we assume that Eve works as a passive listener, hence G is unknown to Alice.
The CSI report from Bob may be overheard by Eve, so we assume that H is also known to Eve. In other words, both Alice and Eve have the same knowledge concerning the link between Alice and Bob. In addition, we also assume that G is known to Eve.
To communicate with Bob, Alice sends a vector signal s ∈ C N a ×1 over its N a antennas. Without loss of generality, we assume that E[ s 2 ] = P t where P t is the transmit power constraint.
The signal received by Bob and Eve can be formulated as
where
and n e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 e I N e ) are complex Gaussian noise vectors seen at Bob and Eve, respectively.
If s take its value from a finite set , then both Bob and Eve can optimally detect the signal using an ML detector aŝ
Otherwise, s can be estimated with a linear detector:
Popular linear detectors include Minimum Mean Squared Error (MMSE) and Zero-Forcing (ZF) detector [26] . Take W e as example, the ZF and MMSE detector are given by
whereP t is the estimation of E s 2 .
B. PSM
In the conventional PSM system [9] , the transmitted signal s is given by
where p i is the precoding vector targeted at the i-th receive
The signal received by Bob can be written as
is the signal precoding matrix, x is a vector with only one non zero element. Explicitly, Px = s = p i X m if the SSK symbol is i and the PSK/QAM symbol is X m .
With the transmitter zero-forcing (TZF) precoding, P constitutes the pseudo-inverse of the MIMO channel H, which is written as
where β is a normalization factor. Bob can jointly detect the SSK symbol i and the PSK/QAM symbol X m with the ML detector:
where e i is the unit coordinate vector with the i-th element being 1. Similar to Bob, the signal received by Eve is y e = GPx+n e and Eve can also perform joint detection on both SSK symbol i and the PSK/QAM symbol X m :
In this subsection, we briefly introduce the secure PSM scheme proposed in [23] , namely the RAS-PSM and HS-PSM. 1 For the reason of comparison with our proposed scheme, a simplified version is presented where only SSK symbol is taken into consideration. In HS-PSM, Alice randomly activates L antennas out of the N a antennas and the remained N a − L antennas are set to be idle. The legitimate channel in HS-PSM is denoted as
Similar to (10), the TZF precoding matrix can be expressed as
where β R is the normalization factor. If L > N b , P R is further perturbed as
is a random artificial noise matrix, whose elements are i.i.d. zero mean complex Gaussian variables. θ is the power allocation factor such that the power ofP = √ θ P R is θ P t , and the power ofP
For the SSK symbol i, the transmit signal is s = P H e i = p H ,i which is the i-th column of P H . The signal received by Bob is written as
In this situation, the ML detector simplifies to find the largest element of y b , i.e.î
where y b,j is the j-th element of y b . The signal received by Eve is written as
where p R,i ,p i are, respectively, the i-th column of P R andP. In Eq. (17), Gp i is the artificial noise, p R,i is a random vector depends on the SSK symbol i and the random TAS pattern R ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N a L }. Eve can jointly detector i and R as following:
The reason that HS-PSM can enhance the secrecy performance is that (1) with the randomly selected transmit antennas, the searching space for Eve is increased to N b N a L while it is N b for Bob; (2) with the introduction of the artificial noise, Eve is seriously interfered whilst Bob is slightly influenced.
It should be noted that HS-PSM requires that N a ≥ L ≥ N b . In case N a = L > N b , HS-PSM is essentially equivalent to the SPSM scheme proposed in [21] . In case N a = L = N b , it is reduced to a normal PSM.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
In this paper, we propose a novel scheme where the secrecy performance is enhanced by preventing Eve from using ML detector. This is realized through a random precoding which minimize the energy received at the target antenna. The details of the proposed scheme is elaborated in the following subsection.
A. OPERATIONS IN THE PROPOSED SCHEME 1) OPERATION AT ALICE For each block of k information bits intended for Bob, Alice maps them into the index of Bob's antennas. Suppose the i-th receive antenna has been selected, then the SSK symbol i is randomly mapped to a precoding signal vector s which satisfies
and
where is a predefined threshold, P t is the maximum transmit power.
In next subsection, we will present two algorithms for generating such s.
2) OPERATION AT BOB
The signal received by Bob is given in (1). The j-th element of y b can be expressed as
is the j-th element of noise vector n b . It should be noted that α j , j = i is unknown to Bob due to the randomness of s. Hence the ML detector like (3) is not applicable. However, (22) suggests that the low complexity energy detector (ED) can be used to detect the SSK symbol i,
The signal received by Eve is given in (2). The j-th element of y e is y e,j = β j + n e,j , j = 1, 2, · · · , N e ,
where β j = g † j s. n e,j is the j-th element of the noise vector n e . Obviously, Eve can not use the energy detector as (24) to detect the antenna index because s is designed for the main channel H. On the other hand, β 1 , β 2 , · · · , β N b are unknown to Eve, thus the ML detector (4) is neither applicable.
Assuming Eve knows H and G, then the possible way for Eve to crack the information can be: 1) Estimate s with a linear estimator; 2) Imitate the signal received by Bob and then use energy detection. With a linear detector W, the estimated s can be expressed ass
Based on this estimation, Eve can construct a signalỹ b to imitate the observation of Bob:
and then use energy detection to find the index of the target antenna:î
whereỹ b,j is the j-th element ofỹ b .
B. RANDOM PRECODING ALGORITHMS
In this subsection, we present two example algorithms which can be used by Alice to generate the random precoding signal s. Note that constraint (19) implies that s must be chosen from the null space of h † . Applying the singular value decomposition (SVD) on h † i , the i-th row of H, we obtain
where u i ∈ C is a scalar, σ i is the singular value, 0 1×(N a −1) is a zero vector of dimension N a − 1, and
Note that
consists of N a − 1 unitary vectors, thus the constraint (21) can be translated to
Substitute (30) into (20) yields
In summary, the transmit signal s can be generated via The Algorithm 1 generates random complex numbers c i,1 , c i,2 , · · · , c i,N a −1 , and then normalize c i with (31), construct s with (30) , and then check whether s meets the constraint (20) or (32). If yes, return s. Otherwise, regenerate s until it meets the requirements or the number of trials has reached the maximum limit M .
Obviously, Algorithm 1 can guarantee the constraints (19) and (21), however, it is possible that the final output after M trials may not meet the constraint (20) . In this latter situation, we use the one with largest α min = min j =i {|α j |}. To guarantee the threshold constraint (20) , the power control strategy is introduced in Algorithm 2, which is basically the same as Algorithm 1 except that, after M trials, the final output will be scaled by a factor such that the transmit power s 2 is at its minimum value and (20) holds for all j = i. 
Algorithm 1 Random Precoding Algorithm

IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section we analysis the detection error rate at Bob and Eve. Without loss of generality, we assume that Alice has selected the first antenna of Bob, i.e. i = 1, and that σ 2 e = σ 2 b = σ 2 .
A. THE DETECTION ERROR RATE AT BOB
Under the condition i = 1, the signal received by Bob can be expressed as
With the energy detector (24) , an error will occur if |y b,1 | 2 is larger than any of
Define
The pairwise error probability (PEP) [27] between two antenna indices (i = 1, j > 1) can be written as 
and {Y j } are i.i.d. Rician variables with PDF given by
Due to the mutual independency of X , Y j , the pairwise error probability (36) can be calculated as The integral in the right-hand-side of (40) is actually an integral over the Rician PDF (38), so we have
Now, according to the union bound [27] , the detection error probability at Bob, denoted by P b , can be bounded by
where α min = min{|α 2 |, |α 3 |, · · · , |α N a |}. The average error rate is then bounded by
where the expectation is over the random variables α 2 , α 3 , · · · , α N 1 which are determined by the random matrix H and the random signal s. It is difficult to find the analytical expressions for the distribution of |α j | 2 , so it is almost impossible to derive any closed form result concerning the average error rateP b . However, the result we have obtained is very insightful for the design of the proposed scheme.
Note that the exponential function e −x decreases rapidly as x increases. Hence, for the given H and s, P b can be approximated by the largest PEP:
If s satisfies constraint (20) , then α min ≥ , hence
where≤ stands for approximately less than or equal to. Therefore, if the target error rate is P 0 , then the threshold should be set to = σ −2 ln(2P 0 ).
(46)
B. THE DETECTION ERROR RATE AT EVE
Under the condition i = 1, the signal received by Eve can be expressed as
whereỹ b,j is the j-th element ofỹ b which is defined in (27) , α j is defined in (23),ñ b,j is the j-th element ofñ b =ỹ b − Hs which is the equivalent noise seen by Eve. Considering MMSE detector, by substitute (2), (26) into (27) ,ỹ b can be expressed as
Comparing (48) with (1), we can see that, by constructing y b with (27) , Eve has reproduced the link between Alice and Bob. The reproduced channel has the same desired signal Hs. The only difference between the real main channel and the reproduced channel lies in the noise vectors n b andñ b .
The equivalent noisen b can be further expressed as
where A = H(WG − I), B = HW . The term As stands for the residual interference due to non-ZF transform, the second term stands for the inherent noise enhancement of linear detection [28] . The average power of the equivalent noise is given by
Assume that σ 2 b = σ 2 e = σ 2 , then the noise rise at Eve is defined as
where SNR P t /σ 2 . Note thatñ b is not necessarily distributed as 
C. EFFECT OF IMPERFECT CSI
In the practical systems, the channel state information known to Alice and Eve is generally inaccurate due to various limitations including channel estimation error, CSI feedback error, outdated feedback and etc.. This implies that, for the signal models shown in (1) and (2), Alice does not know H, Eve does not know H and G. What is known to Alice and Eve is the inaccurate estimationĤ andĜ. Alice is usingĤ instead of H to generate the transmit signal s, while Eve is usingĜ andĤ to reproduce the main channel. Similar to [29] , [30] and many other literatures, we can model the channel matrix H, G as
respectively, whereH andG represent the CSI error. Usually, the elements ofH are modeled as i.i.d. zero mean complex Gaussian variables of variance σ 2
H
.G is modeled similarly with element variance σ 2 G . Letĥ † i denotes the i-th row ofĤ, andV 0 i denotes the orthogonal basis of the null space ofĥ † i . With imperfect CSI, the transmit signal generated by Alice can be written aŝ
where c i contains N a − 1 complex numbers which is used to generateŝ with Algorithm 1 or Algorithm 2. The consequence of CSI error inĥ † i is the deviation ofV 0
where λ ≤ 1 is a scaling factor accounting for the normalization, represents the basis deviation. Substitute (56) into (55) yieldŝ
This equation indicates that the effect of CSI error has two folds. On the one hand, the scaling factor λ will cause the effective transmit power loss, since λs 2 ≤ s 2 . On the other hand, the deviation of orthogonal basis will effect as an artificial noise n CSI = c i . This noise is broadcast to Bob and Eve together with s.
Except for these two effects mentioned above, Eve will also suffer from the CSI error inĜ. The inaccuracy ofĜ will lead to the mismatch of MMSE detector, which will further result in a greater residual interference or noise enhancement.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use simulation to verify the performance of the proposed scheme. For the reason of simplicity, the simulation assumes that both Bob and Eve have the same noise power, σ 2 b = σ 2 e = σ 2 . The Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) is defined as SNR= P t /σ 2 .
A. SER UNDER FIXED H, G, S
As we have discussed in Section 4, for fixed H, G, s, the SSK symbol error rate of Bob is bounded by (42), and the error rate of Eve can be approximately bounded by (52). Fig. 2 compares these bounds with the simulated SER. Throughout the simulation, H, G, s are randomly generated and then fixed for the whole simulation. In Fig.2 , UB and LB represent, respectively, the theoretical upper and lower bound of SER as shown in (42) By comparing (42) and (52), we may think that, in the proposed scheme, the main channel has approximately a gain of ρ over the eavesdropper channel where ρ is the noise rise defined in (51). The simulated average noise rise, E[ρ], is shown in Fig.3 under the antenna setting N b = N e = 4, N a = 3, 4, 5, where the expectation is over random matrices H, G and the random precoding vector s. From this figure we can see that the the main channel has always a positive gain over eavesdropper channel in the SNR range 0 ∼ 20dB and increases with the increase of SNR and N a indicating that the performance of eavesdropper will decline significantly as SNR and N a increase. Moreover, even when N a is less than N b and N e , the average noise rise is greater than 1 (0dB), which means that our scheme still has certain security if Alice has less antenna than Bob and Eve.
B. AVERAGE SER WITH ALGORITHM 1
Under the constraint (19) , the transmit signal s may not meet the constraints (20) and (21) simultaneously. The Algorithm 1 proposed in Section 3 can guarantee the transmit power constraint but it may violate the threshold constraint (20) . Fig. 4 plots the success rate of α min ≥ as a function of parameter M in Algorithm 1 under various SNR conditions. The threshold is set by (46) with target detection error rate as P 0 = 10 −3 . As expected, the success rate increases with the increase of trial number M . The reason that success rate increase with SNR is that, for the fixed P 0 , decreases with SNR. Fig. 5 compares our proposed scheme with HS-PSM scheme [23] which we have briefly introduced in Section II-C. In the proposed scheme, the transmit signal s is generated using Algorithm 1 with M = 32 and P 0 = 10 −3 , Bob adopts energy detector, Eve adopts the method presented in Section III-A. In HS-PSM scheme, the transmit signal s = p H ,i is the i-th column of P H with the power allocation factor θ = 0.6, both Bob and Eve adopts ML detector. It should be noted that, in the proposed scheme, the threshold varies with SNR attempting to maintain the error rate below the target P 0 = 10 −3 . However, as Fig. 4 has illustrated, there is high probability that s generated by Alice can not meet the threshold requirement, and such probability increases as SNR decreases. On the other hand, when SNR is high, α min = min j =i |h † j s| may be much larger than the threshold. This can explain why the SER of the proposed scheme is not a constant line around P 0 but a curve decreasing monotonously with the increase of SNR. Fig. 6 shows the SER performance for the antenna setting where the number of antennas at Eve and Bob are fixed to N b = N e = 4 while the number of antennas at Alice can be N a = 3, 4, 5. The transmit signal s is generated by Algorithm 1 with M=32 and P 0 = 10 −3 . As shown in Fig. 6 , when the number of transmit antennas increases, the SER of Bob drops, and the eavesdropping effect of Eve is obviously worse. In particular, when N a exceeds N e , Eve can hardly overhear any information. This is mainly due to the degenerate-rank of G which leads to significant increase of ρ defined in (51).
Note that, the antenna setting N a = 3 is not applicable to PSM schemes due to the rank-degenerate of the signal precoding matrix defined in (10) . In addition, with the setting N a = N b = 4, the HS-PSM is reduced to the normal PSM scheme. Fig. 7 shows the SER performance for different number of eavesdrop antennas and with the antenna number at Alice and Bob being fixed as N a = 8 and N b = 4. The transmit signal s is generated by Algorithm 1 with M=32 and P 0 = 10 −3 . According to the simulation result, when N a is larger than N e , the SER performance of Eve is much worse than Bob. By equipping more antennas, Eve can increase its interception capability. However, if Eve want to have the similar performance as Bob, much more antennas are required.
C. AVERAGE SER WITH ALGORITHM 2
In the previous figures, s is generated with Algorithm 1 which can meet the transmit power constraint but has no guarantee to satisfy the threshold constraint (20) . In other words, such s can not maintain a fixed SER target. For this reason, Algorithm 2 has adopted the power adaptation strategy to meet the constraint (20) with equality. The simulation results are shown in Fig. 8 for antenna setting N a = N b = N e = 4. As expected, the SER of Bob is maintained at the target P 0 for various noise levels. At the same time, the SER of Eve is maintained at a much worse level.
With Algorithm 2, the transmit power P t varies dynamically with the random realization of H. The average transmit power is shown in Fig. 9 . The average transmit power increases linearly with the noise level in deci-Bell domain. This is not surprising. According to (46), 2 is proportional to σ 2 . On the other hand, with Algorithm 2 we have 2 = α 2 min which is in turn proportional to s 2 = P t . It should be noted that, with Algorithm 2, the transmit power P t is a random variable which is unknown to Eve. In performing MMSE detection (7), we assume that Eve knows average transmit power and E[P t ] is used in place of P t in (7). . As can be seen from the figure, our proposed scheme is robust to the small CSI error. In addition, imperfect CSI is not a chance for Eve to intercept the confidential message of Bob.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel secure transmission scheme based on receive spatial modulation in which the index of receive antenna is used to convey information. In the proposed algorithm, the transmitter sends a random signal which lies in the null space of the target receive antenna and the legitimate receiver can identify the target antenna with a low complexity energy detector. The randomness of the transmit signal has prevented Eve from using maximumlikelihood detection and hence its interception capability has been greatly degraded. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results have confirmed the effectiveness of the proposed scheme. Moreover, the proposed scheme can provide secure protection in some extent for scenarios where the transmitter has less antenna than the receiver.
